A Short Discussion with General McChrystal

If you've read some of my previous posts, you know that I served under General McChrystal when he was a mere Captain in command of A Company, 3/75 Rangers at Fort Benning back in 1987.  As a young private back then, I spent my time doing my best to keep out of trouble and learn the ropes as a newly-minted Ranger.  One thing I learned early is that the Ranger regiment was known for first-class leaders, and that my job wasn't to understand why, but to follow orders to the best of my ability.

Today, Mcchrystal commands much more than a 120-man company of Rangers.  In fact, he's the senior US military official in Afghanistan - in charge of the entire International Security Assistance Force and a four-star General.  In short, the job of winning the war against the Taliban has been put squarely on his shoulders, and from my experience, I'd say there is probably no one better qualified to do the job.

After spending a month on the ground in March and April, I returned home more confused than optimistic.  That's because the units I embedded with - mostly special operations and DEA - were continually having good missions canceled - and some frustrated operators speculated it was a ploy to avoid bad news (i.e. casualties, military or civilian).  Privately, many of the warriors we spoke to were critical of McChrystal's "kinder, gentler" approach to winning the war.  As one operator put it, "Rules of engagement do not constitute a strategy."

I felt like General McChrystal deserved to answer this criticism, so I sent him an email, not so much as a journalist but as a fellow Ranger.  I received a prompt, personal reply, which made me feel quite honored, considering how incredibly busy the General's schedule is.

In it, General McChrystal made his stance very clear. 

" I may see the right approach to this effort differently than some.  After almost 9 years of trying a kinetic approach - the problem is worse.  Am not sure that larger doses of a cure that has not worked is the right approach.

 I believe we're on the only [course of action] that can work here.  It varies by location and involves direct action as well as a variety of other approaches."

He has a point - whatever we've been doing up till now hasn't been working.  My belief is that the "kinetic approach," (meaning, hunting down the taliban and killing them) wasn't the problem, too many competing interests was.  By that, I mean that ISAF is made up of 43 countries, only a dozen of which will actually allow their troops to fight.  Which translates to a very small percentage of the soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines in Afghanistan ever leaving the base - in short, lots of bureaucratic friction.

Without a doubt, McChrystal's approach is unconventional - which is his forte.  I, for one, am willing to give him the benefit of the doubt.  But he doesn't have long to prove his strategy, and unfortunately, sometimes the Taliban are the least of his worries. 

His biggest battles may well be in another theater - Washington DC.